Open science initiatives have gained traction in recent years. However, open peer-review practices, i.e., reforms that (i) modify the identifiability of stakeholders and (ii) establish channels for the open communication of information between stakeholders, have seen very little adoption in economics. In this paper, we explore the feasibility and desirability of such reforms. We present insights derived from survey data documenting the attitudes of 802 experimental/behavioral economists, a conceptual framework, a literature review, and cross-disciplinary data on current journal practices. On (i), most respondents support preserving anonymity for referees, but views about anonymity for authors and associate editors are mixed. On (ii), most respondents are open to publishing anonymized referee reports, sharing reports between referees, and allowing authors to appeal editorial decisions. Active reviewers, editors, and respondents from the US/Canada are generally less open to transparency reforms.

Peer review is central to the lives of researchers. We conduct a survey on improving peer review to which we received responses from over 1,400 economists. The survey is the bedrock of this article, which was written to (i) document the current state of peer review and (ii) investigate concrete steps towards improving it. We offer a snapshot of the recent submission and peer review activity of respondents, detail the difficulties they report facing, and measure their attitudes about various challenges and possible proposals to address them. We hope that this report will provide fertile ground for the development and implementation of practical solutions for improving peer review in economics.

Teams are ubiquitous in the modern workplace because of their potential to outperform individuals by drawing on diverse perspectives, deliberating about them, and aggregating them wisely. However, dynamics like herding can render teamwork counterproductive. In light of competing forces, we study key determinants of team performance and investigate whether alternative group formats can outperform teams. In our experiment, subjects design portfolios to maximize returns and minimize volatility, first individually and then in one of three group formats: (i) Crowds, who work alone but whose portfolios are mechanically pooled together; (ii) Panels, who communicate but whose individual portfolios are still pooled together; and (iii) Teams, who communicate and submit a joint portfolio. Teams outperform individuals by constructing less concentrated portfolios and reducing volatility. They perform particularly well when teammates hold differing market expectations; diversity in thinking styles confers no similar benefit. However, Teams substantially underperform Crowds. Panels underperform Crowds by a similar margin, implying that communication is the primary driver of underperformance rather than the aggregation rule. Communication induces asset pruning, reallocation to stocks with high historical returns, and convergence between partners’ individual portfolios. Our findings demonstrate that teamwork can be inferior to alternative group structures, especially in settings where it is important to preserve independence and the diversity of opinions.

We introduce a comprehensive method for evaluating the design of experiments and use it to document the current state of experimental design in economics. We also explore potential trade-offs between design features.

We leverage a meta-analysis to investigate the practice of collecting forecasts of research results. We conceptualize and measure the returns to this practice and assess the accuracy of forecasts relative to actual study results.